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CHAPTER 8 
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
_________________________ 
I: Introduction  
 According to the constitutionalism notion, the constitution, to be consistent 
with the rule of law principle, has to embody the seperation of state powers as a 
measure for safeguarding the rights and liberties of the people and it must be 
recognised as the supreme law of the country. In line with that conception, 
legislative actions must be constitutional whilst all actions of the executive and the 
judiciary have to be lawful as well. Moreover, in order to prevent the state from 
abusing its powers in a manner jeopardising rights and liberties of the people, 
actions by state agencies will have to be subject to judicial review. 
 Following such idea of constitutionalism, the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand lays down measures safeguarding the rights and liberties of the people. As 
a preventive measure, the Legislature is prohibited from enacting laws restricting 
such rights and liberties of the people as recognised by the Constitution, except by 
virtue of provisions of the law specifically enacted for the purpose and only to the 
extent of neccessity and provided that they shall not affect the essential substances 
of such rights and liberties. Such provisions of the law must, in addition, be of 
general application and may not be intended to apply to any particulare case or 
person. No matter so well this preventive measure has been inserted into the 
Constitution, in practice, the exercise of state powers, whether the legislative power, 
the executive power or the judicial power, which is done through a person, will 
unavoidably encroach upon rights and liberties of private individuals. For this reason, 
the Constitution also enshrines a corrective measure, that is, making a violating 
action by state official subject to a review by a judicial or non-judicial body. Our 
examination in this Chapter will be limited to judicial review.  
 As already explained in other Chapters, the Constitution has established 4 
categories of Courts with different jurisdictions. Certainly, such division 
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occasionally gives rise to the jurisdictional problem. In this Chapter, discussions will 
be focused on the following: (1) the judicial system under the Constitution (2) the 
relationship among courts and (3) problems relevant to the relationship among 
courts. 
II.  The Judicial System under the Current Constitution 
 Provisions of Chapter VIII on Courts establish the quartet judicial system. 
There are four main courts, namely, the Constitutional Court, Courts of Justice, 
Administrative Court and Military Court. The court of each category has 
independent and different functions.   
1. The Constitutional Court 
Although the Constitutional Court is not at the top of the hierachy in the 
quartet judicial system, it is regarded as the most important court in view of its 
jurisdiction over the determination of constitutionality-related issues. The inspection 
system over the constitutionality-related issues in Thailand changed over time. Early 
constitutions regarded the House of Representatives as having supreme competence 
to interprete the constitution, as can be seen in the Constitutions of 1932. At the 
second stage, the constitution conferred such competence upon the National 
Assembly and the Constitutional Tribunal (as envisioned in the Constitution of 1946, 
the Constitution of 1947, the Constitution of 1949, the Constitution of 1952, the 
Constitution of 1974 and the Constitution of 1978). At a later time, only the 
Constitutional Tribunal was recognised by the constitution as competent to 
interprete the constitution1. In the drafting process of the current Constitution, some 
studies suggested that the Constitutional Tribunal was fraught with much difficulty, 
it encountered the lack of autonomy and inability to perform functions on a 
continuous fashion. The defects were occasioned by its inappropriate composition 
that was largely made up of politicians and, in addition, by the fact that the term of 
                                                          
1 Amorn Chandara-Somboon, “The Constitutional Court”, Administrative Law Journal. Vol. 
12, December, 1993, pp. 519-609. 
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office of its member was dependent on the term of the House of Representative.2 
Therefore, there was made a proposal for the establishment of a Constitutional Court 
to bridle those shortcomings. This proposal was adopted and has given rise to 
several provisions in the present Consitution dealing with the 'Constitutional Court'. 
We will now discuss two major functions of the Constitutional Court: firstly, the 
determination of constitutionality issues and, secondly, the determination of powers 
and duties of organs established by the Constitution. 
 1.1 The Constitutionality Determination Role 
 The power to determine the constitutionality of legislation is of significant 
importance. The Constitutional Court considers whether any provision of any law is 
contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution. A legal provision that is found 
unconstitutional will be nullified or void. The Constitutional Court can make the 
determination about the constitutionality both before promulgation of the legislation 
in question (that is, at the stage of a Bill) or after the law has already been 
promulgated.  
 (1) Determining the Constitutionality of A Bill 
 Any bill approved by the National Assembly can be examined by the 
Constitutional Court as to whether it is contrary to or inconsistent with the 
Constitution. In this connection, a request may be directed to the Constitutional 
Court for considering a Bill before the Prime Minister presents it to the King for the 
King's signature. If the Constitutinal Court decides that a statement contained in the 
bill is contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution and that statement constitutes 
the essential component of the Bill, then the bill will lapse in its entirety. If the 
problematic statement does not form the essential element of the Bill, it will follow 
that only such statement will have to be scraped. 
 
 
                                                          
2  Rachata Promwan, Directions for Developing the Autonomy of the Members of the 
Constitutional Tribunal in Thailand, Thesis, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, p. 106, 
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 (2) Determining the Constitutionality of an Act  
  Even though the Constitution attempts to forestall unconstitutionality at the 
outset through the mechanism by which a Bill can be challenged as unconstitution, 
certain bills may probably elude the unconstitutionality censorship and may 
eventually be promulgated. It is for this reason that the Constitution also provides 
for a measure for deciding on the constitutionality of a promulgated Act. In a case 
brought before the Court of Justice, if the Court is of opinion that, or if a party to the 
litigation raises an objection that, the provisions of the Act at issue are contrary to or 
inconsistent with the Constitution and there has not been a decision of the 
Constitutional Court with regard to such provisions, the Court of Justice is obligated 
to stay the trial and adjudication of the case and refer the constitutionality issue to 
the Constitutional Court for its consideration and determination. 
 1.2 Determining Powers and Duties of Constitutional Organs 
 Now that the Constitution establishes several supervisory organs in charge of 
inspecting the exercise of state powers, conflicts may possibly arise as to powers and 
duties of those organs. This will, no doubt, have impacts on the exercise of state 
powers along the line of the spirits of the Constitution. The Constitution, therefore, 
confers upon the Constitutional Court the power to make the determination of the 
emerging conflicts.3 
The justifications for empowering the Constitutional Court to settle this kind 
of conflict are twofold. First, given that the conflict arises as regards the powers and 
duties of organs established by the Constitution, the Constitutional Court should be 
in a better position than any other body to determine the conflict. Secondly, it must 
be recalled that the Constitutional Court has the power to interpret provisions of the 
Constitution. A conflict regarding powers and duties of organs under the 
Constitution is, in reality, the conflict needing interpretation of the provisions of the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
cited in Banjerd Singkaneti, General Concepts Underlying the Constitutional Court, 
Bangkok: Winyoochon, 2001, p. 129.  
3 However, in case of a conflict over jurisdictions of courts, such conflict, according to the 
Constitution, is to be resolved by a separate specially established commission rather than by 
the Constitutional Court. (Before the current Constitution, a jurisdictional conflict between 
courts was to be referred to the Constitutional Tribunal.) 
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Constitution concerned, with a result that it falls within the competence of the 
Constitutional Court accordingly.  
    2. The Court of Justice 
According to Chapter VIII, Part 3 of the Constitution, the Court of Justice 
has competence to try and adjudicate all cases except those specified to be within the 
jurisdiction of other special courts. There are three levels of Courts of Justice, 
namely, the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of 
Justice. 
In the Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitution also establishes a special 
division – the Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions – dedicated 
to trying accusations made against those holding political positions, as initially 
discussed in the previous chapter. According to the Organic Act on Criminal 
Procedure for Persons Holding Political Positions B.E. 2542 (1999), the trial and 
inquiry conducted by the Supreme Court of Justice's Criminal Division for Persons 
Holding Political Positions shall be based on the case-file prepared and referred to it 
by the National Counter Corruption Commission, but the Supreme Court of Justice's 
Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions may conduct additional 
hearings for fact finding as it thinks fit. A decision will be by a majority of votes and 
each member of the quorum is required to prepare a wriiten opinion and to give a 
verbal statement at a meeting of the quorum before a final resolution is passed by 
the quorum. An order and judgement of the Supreme Court of Justice's Criminal 
Division for Persons Holding Political Position is to be taken as final and is also 
required to be published.  
 The Constitution provides for a safeguard of judicial independence of judges 
of Courts of Justice. The promotion of judges is not dependent on ministerial or 
administrative officials but is within attentive oversight by the 'Judicial Commission 
of the Courts of Justice' which is set up by the Constitution and composed of judges 
from all levels of the Courts of Justice. Under the new Constitution, the Court of 
Justice also has an independent administrative office in charge of studying and 
evaluating performances and gathering judicial precedents. 
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  3. The Administrative Court 
 The present Constitution adopts the dual judicial system whereby the 
Administrative Court is separated from the Court of Justice. Under section 276 of 
the Constitution, the Administrative Court have the powers to try and adjudicate (a) 
cases of dispute between a State agency, State enterprise, local government 
organisation, or State official under the superintendence or supervision of the 
Government on one part and a private individual on the other part, or (b) cases of 
dispute amongst State agencies, State enterprises, local government organisations, or 
State officials under the superintendence or supervision of the Government. The 
dispute must be as a consequence of the act or omission of the act that the law 
requires to be performed by such State agency, State enterprise, local government 
organisation, or State official, or as a consequence of the act or omission of the act 
under the responsibility of such State agency, State enterprise, local government 
organisation or State official in the performance of duties under the law.  
 The Organic Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and 
Administrative Court Procedures, B.E. 2542 (1999), which has been enacted in the 
implementation of the Constitution, specifies the following cases as falling within 
the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court:  
(1) the case involving a dispute in relation to an unlawful act committed by 
an administrative agency or the State official, be it in connection with the issuance 
of a by-law or an order or in connection with any other act, by reason of acting 
without or beyond the scope of the powers and duties or inconsistently with the law 
or the form, process or procedure which is the material requirement for such act or 
in bad faith or in a manner indicating unfair discrimination or causing unnecessary 
process or excessive burden to the public or amounting to undue exercise of 
discretion; 
 (2) the case involving a dispute in relation to an administrative agency or 
State official neglecting official duties required by the law to be performed or 
performing such duties with unreasonable delay; 
 124
 (3) the case involving dispute in relation to a wrongful act or other liability 
of an administrative agency or State official arising from the exercise of power 
under the law or from a by-law, administrative order or other order, or from the 
neglect of official duties required by law to be performed or the performance of such 
duties with unreasonable delay; and 
 (4) the case involving a dispute in relation to an administrative contract. 
  In sum, the Administrative Courts, as established for the first time by the 
Constitution and the Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and 
Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999), will play a vital role in 
inspecting lawfulness or legality of administrative acts. Such scrutiny will, in turn, 
result in a better safeguard of rights and liberties of individuals as well as more 
transparent and accountable administrative performance. 
4. The Military Court 
 The Military Court has competence to try and adjudicate military criminal 
cases. There are three levels of the Military Court: (1) the Military Court of First 
Instance, (2) the Central Military Court and (3) the Supreme Military Court. The 
Military Court will try and adjudicate only criminal cases in which criminal offences 
are committed by military officers; the Military Court has no competence over civil 
disputes. The prime justification for establishing the Military Court as a separate 
judicial body from ordinary Courts of Justice lies in an attempt to impose a more 
stringent control on military members. This will help prevent military officers from 
committing unpeaceful acts rather than performing peace-keeping duties. 
III.  Relationship among Judicial Bodies  
 As spelled out above, four types of Courts have been established by the 
Constitution, namely, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Justice, the 
Administrative Court and the Military Court. In effect, some relationships can be 
found in the classification. We will here look at, first, the relationship  between the 
Constitutional Court and other Courts and, secondly, the relationships among the 
Court of Justice, the Administrative Court and the Military Court. 
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 1.  Relationships between the Constitutional Court and other Courts  
 The relationships between the Constitutional Court and other Courts can be 
explored in two dimensions: the relationship in connection with the jurisdiction and 
the relationship in the aspect of the binding force of decisions of the Constitutional 
Court on other Courts. 
1.1  Jurisdictional Relationship  
 The Constitutional Court has specific competence in interpreting provisions 
of the Constitution. This competence does not vest in other Courts.  No other Court 
can, therefore, decide constitutionality of given legislation or disputes involving 
powers and duties of the organs established by the Constitution. Other Courts may 
have a part in the constitutionality-determination process only by way of referring 
the issue to the Constitutional Court where such issue is perceived by the Court itself 
or is raised by the litigant party, in litigation ex casu before the Court.  
1.2 Binding Effect of the Constitutional Court’s Decisions 
 Under section 274 of the Constitution, a decision of the Constitutional Court 
is binding on other Courts in the enforcement and interpretation of laws. Further, 
section 2685 provides that a decision of the Constitutional Court shall be deemed 
final and binding on other Courts, provided, however, that it will not prejudice 
final judgments of other Courts.6 
                                                          
4 Section 27: Rights and liberties recognised by this Constitution expressly, by implication 
or by decision of the Constitutional Court shall be protected and directly binding on the 
National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, Courts and other State organs in enacting, 
applying and interpreting laws. 
5 Section 268: The decision of the Constitutional Court shall be deemed final and binding 
on the National Assembly, Council of Ministers, Courts and other State organs. 
6 This qualification is expressly stipulated in section 264 paragraph three of the Constitution. 
 Section 264: In the application of the provisions of any law to any case, if the Court 
by itself is of the opinion that, or a party to the case raises an objection that, the provisions 
of such law fall within the provisions of section 6 and there has not yet been a decision of 
the Constitutional Court on such provisions, the Court shall stay its trial and adjudication of 
the case and submit, in the course of official service, its opinion to the Constitutional Court 
for consideration and decision. 
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 2.   The Relationships among the Court of Justice,  
  the Administrative Court and the Military Court  
 As mentioned above, the Court of Justice is the court with general 
competence to try and adjudicate all cases not falling under the jurisdiction of other 
special Courts. However, there may occur a dispute between different courts over 
their jurisdiction to try a case in question. Such jurisdictional dispute is considered 
and determined by a jurisdictional committee specifically set up for this purpose. 
The committee is chaired by the President of the Supreme Court and consists of the 
President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Head of the Office of Military 
Judges, the President of other Courts (in case other special Courts are established), 
and other qualified persons (not exceeding four in number). 
The Committee takes charge of considering and making the determination of 
a jurisdictional issue as referred to it by a Court or a party to a case. More precisely, 
three scenarios of conflicts can be referred to the Committee for deliberation; first, 
the conflict as to the jurisdicition of different courts, second, the conflict emerging 
from different final judgments or different orders of Courts and, finally, the conflict 
between Courts in connection with provisional measures before judgment, the filing 
of a motion with the Court before litigation as provided by law, the taking of 
evidence before litigation, the execution of judgment or order and the performance 
of other duties of the Courts. 
IV:  Problems Involving Relationships among the Judiciary 
 We have now experienced a critical problem in connection with the 
relationship among judicial bodies. The problem, indeed, takes root from a decision 
of the Constitutional Court No. 24/2543 which was concerned with the Regulation 
of the Election Commission on Calling for a New Election Before the 
Announcement of the Result of the Election of Senators (No. 2), B.E. 2543 (2000). 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 In the case where the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the objection of a 
party under paragraph one is not essential for decision, the Constitutional Court may refuse 
to accept the case for consideration. 
 The decision of the Constitutional Court shall apply to all cases but shall not affect 
final judgments of the Courts.  
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This Regulation intended to bar a person from being a candidate in an election of a 
senator if that person was a candidate in a previous election of a senator and, at that 
prior election, was refused an announcement of the election result on more than one 
occasion. The facts of this saga and the much criticised decision of the 
Constitutional Court can succintly be explained below. 
 The Ombudsman received a complaint from a candidate in an election of a 
senator for Udonthani Province. It was alleged that the Regulation issued by the 
Election Commission was unconstitutional by reason of its repugnance to section 
1267 of the Constitution, and based upon such allegedly unconstitutionality, it was 
requested that the Ombudman refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for its 
decision, in accordance with section 1988 paragraph one of the Constitution. 
 Although the Consitutional Court is a competent organ to make the 
determination as to constitutionality of legislation, the Constitutional Court, in the 
instant case, went on to consider whether this matter would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Administrative Court in accordance with section 276 of the 
Constitution. In this instance, the Constitution Court’s interpretation of section 276 
of the Constitution has sparked a serious problem surrounding the jurisdiction of the 
Administrative Court. 
                                                          
7 Section 126: A person under any of the following qualifications shall have no right to be a 
candidate in an election of senators: 
(1) being a member of or holder of other position of a political party; 
(2) being a member of the House of Representatives or having been a member of 
the House of Representatives and his or her membership has terminated for not yet more 
than one year up to the date of applying for the candidacy; 
 (3) being or having been a senator in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution during the term of the Senate preceding the application for the candidacy; 
 (4) being disfranchised under section 109 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (11), 
(12), (13) or (14). 
8Section 198: In the case where the Ombudsman is of opinion that the provisions of the law, 
rules, regulations or any act of any person under section 197 (1) begs the question of the 
constitutionality, the Ombudsman shall submit the case and the opinion to the Constitutional 
Court or Administrative Court for decision in accordance with the procedure of the 
Constitutional Court or the law on the procedure of the Administrative Court, as the case 
may be.  
 128
 The provision in question – section 276 paragraph one of the Constitution –  
which is the general provision spelling out the competence of the Administrative 
Court states “The Administrative Courts have the powers to try and adjudicate cases 
of dispute between a State agency, State enterprise, local government organisation, 
or State official under the superintendence or supervision of the Government on one 
part and a private individual on the other part, or between a State agency, State 
enterprise, local government organisaiton, or State official under the 
superintendence or supervision of the Government on one part and another such 
agency, enterprise, organisation or official on the other part as provided by law” 
(emphasis added). The Constitutional Court has decided that the 
Administrative Court in this case had no power to decide the legal status of 
the Regulation issued by the Election Commission, the reason being that the 
Election Commission, as an independent organ under the Constitution itself, 
is not “a State agency, State enterprise, local government organisation, or State 
official under the superintendence or supervision of the Government”. This being so, 
the constitutionality of the Regulation of the Election Commission in the case under 
discussion would straightforwardly fall under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court, and, with regard to the consitutionality, the Constitutional Court was of the 
opinon that the said Regulation ran counter to the Constitution – it was inconsistent 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 The Constitutional Court or Administrative Court, as the case may be, shall decidde the 
case submitted by the Ombudsman under paragraph one without delay. 
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with section 29 paragraph one9 and section 12610 of the Constitution – and, thus 
became unenforceable, in accordance with section 6.11 
 The decision of the Constitutional Court No. 24/2543 has, inadvertently or 
not, produced at least two major consequences. Independent organs established by 
the Constitution are, firstly, not under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court, 
with the immediate result that there will be a dual system of judicial review.  
 1.  Jurisdiction of the Administrative Court over  
  Independent Constitutional Organs   
 As a result of the decision of the Constitutional Court above, an independent 
organ set up by the Constitution will not be under the jurisdiction of the 
Administrative Court, simply because it is not a State agency under the 
superintendence or supervision of the Government. Independent constitutional 
organs can be classified into four categories:  (1) offices of the Courts and offices 
of the independent agencies, (2) agencies or bodies supervising the exercise of state 
powers, (3) the organ overseeing elections and (4) other organs under the 
Constitution.   
 1.1 The Offices of the Courts and Offices of the Independent Agencies 
 The Constitution establishes several offices of courts and offices of 
independent bodies that enjoy autonomy in personnel administration, budget and 
other activities. The list of these offices appears as follows: (1) Office of the 
                                                          
9 Section 29: The restriction of such rights and liberties as recognised by the Constitution 
shall not be imposed on a person except by virtue of provisions of the law specifically 
enacted for the purpose determined by this Constitution and only to the extent of necessity 
and provided that it shall not affect the essential substances of such rights and liberties. 
 The law under paragraph one shall be of general application and shall not be 
intended to apply to any particular case or person; provided that the provision of the 
Constitution authorising its enactment shall also be mentioned therein. 
 The provisions of paragraph one and paragraph two shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
rules or regulations issued by virtue of the provisions of the law. 
10 See note 7, supra. 
11 Section 6: The Constitution is the supreme law of the State. The provisions of any law, 
rule or regulation, which are contary to or inconsistent with this Constitution, shall be 
unenforceable. 
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Constitutional Court, (2) Office of the Court of Justice, (3) Office of Administrative 
Courts, (4) Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) and (5) 
Office of the State Audit.  
 (1) Office of the Constitutional Court  
 According to section 270 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has its 
independent secretariat, with the Secretary-General of the Office of the 
Constitutional Court as the superior responsible directly to the President of the 
Constitutional Court. It is additionally specified that this Office has autonomy in 
personnel administration, budget and other activities as provided by law. 
 (2) Office of the Courts of Justice  
 Section 275 of the Constitution also mandates that the Courts of Justice have 
an independent secretariat, with the Secretary-General of the Office of the Courts of 
Justice as the superior responsible directly to the President of the Supreme Court of 
Justice. Likewise, the Office of the Courts of Justice has autonomy in personnel 
administration, budget and other activities as provided by law. 
 (3) Office of the Administrative Court  
 The Constitution, as set forth in section 280, directs that the Administrative 
Courts have an independent secretariat, with the Secretary-General of the Office of 
the Administrative Courts as the superior responsible directly to the President of the 
Supreme Administrative Court. The Office of the Administrative Courts has 
autonomy in personnel administration, budget and other activities as provided by 
law.  
 (4) Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission  
 Under section 302 of the Constitution, the National Counter Corruption 
Commission has an independent secretariat, with the Secretary-General of the 
National Counter Corruption Commission as the superior responsible directly to the 
President of the National Counter Corruption Commission. The Office of the 
National Counter Corruption Commission has autonomy in personnel administration, 
budget and other activities as provided by law. 
 (5) Office of the State Audit  
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 It is provided in section 312 of the Constitution that the State Audit 
Commission shall have an independent secretariat, with the Auditor-General as the 
superior responsible directly to the Chairman of the State Audit Commission.  
 1.2 Agencies or Bodies Supervising the Exercise of State Powers 
 The agencies or bodies that are to supervise the exercise of state powers 
under the Constitution can be listed as (1) the National Counter Corruption 
Commission, (2) the State Audit Commission, and (3) the Ombudsman.  
 (1) The National Counter Corruption Commission  
 According to the Constitution, the National Counter Corruption Commission 
is the major organ in combat of corruption. The National Counter Corruption 
Commission has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation for the purpose of 
removing key persons from office (section 30512) and the power to refer the matter 
                                                          
12 Section 305: Upon receipt of the request under section 304, the President of the Senate 
shall refer the matter to the National Counter Corruption Commission for investigation 
without delay.  
 When the investigation is complete, the National Counter Corruption Commission 
shall prepare a report thereon for submission to the Senate. The said report shall clearly state 
whether, and to what extent, the accusation put in the request is prima facie case and shall 
state the reasons therefor.  
 In the case where the National Counter Corruption Commission is of the opinion 
that the accusation put in the request is an important matter, the National Counter 
Corruption Commission may make a separate report specifically on the said accusation and 
refer it to the Senate in advance. 
 If the National Counter Corruption Commission passes a resolution that the 
accusation has a prima facie case, the holder of the position against whom the accusation 
has been made shall not, as from the date of such resolution, perform his or her duties until 
the Senate has passed its resolution. The President of the National Counter Corruption 
Commission shall submit the report, existing documents and its opinion to the President of 
the Senate for proceeding in accordance with section 306 and to the Prosecutor General for 
instituting prosecution in the Supreme Court of Justice’s Criminal Division for Persons 
Holding Political Positions. If the National Counter Corruption Commission is of the 
opinion that the accusation has no prima facie case, such accusation shall lapse.  
 In the case where the Prosecutor General is of the opinion that the report, 
documents and opinion submitted by the National Counter Corruption Commission under 
paragraph four are not so complete as to institute prosecution, the Prosecutor General shall 
notify the National Counter Corruption Commission for further proceedings and, for this 
purpose, the incomplete items shall be specified on the same occasion. In such case, the 
National Counter Corruption Commission and the prosecutor General shall appoint a 
working committee, consisting of their representatives in an equal number, for collecting 
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and its opinion to the Supreme Court of Justice's Criminal Division for Person 
Holding Political Positions in order that such judicial body will consider criminal 
liability of the accused position holders  (section 30813). Furthermore, the NCCC has 
the power to inquire and reach a decision as to whether a State official has become 
unusually wealthy or has committed an offence of corruption, malfeasance in office 
or malfeasance in judicial office, and to inspect the accuracy, actual existence as 
well as change of assets and liabilities of the persons holding political positions and 
State officials.    
 (2) The State Audit Commission  
 According to Chapter 11 of the Constitution (as seen in section 31214) and 
the Organic Act on the State Audit, B.E. 2542 (1999), the State Audit Commission 
                                                                                                                                                                   
complete evidence and submit it to the Prosecutor General for further prosecution. In the 
case where the working committee is unable to reach a decision as to the prosecution, the 
National Counter Corruption Commission shall have the power to prosecute by itself or 
appoint a lawyer to prosecute on its behalf. 
13 Section 308: In the case where the Prime Minister, a minister, member of the House of 
Representatives, senator or other political official has been accused of becoming unusually 
wealthy, or of the commission of malfeasance in office according to the Penal Code or a 
dishonest act in the performance of duties or corruption according to other laws, the 
Supreme Court of Justice’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions shall 
have the competent jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the case. 
 The provisions of paragraph one shall also apply to the case where the said person 
or other person is a principal, an instigator or a supporter. 
14 Section 312: The State audit shall be carried out by the State Audit Commission and the 
Auditor-General who is independent and impartial. 
 The State Audit Commission consists of the Chairman and nine other members 
appointed by the King with the advice of the Senate, from persons with expertise and 
experience in state audit, accounting, internal audit, finance and other fields. 
 The State Audit Commission shall have an independent secretariat, with the 
Auditor-General as the superior responsible directly to the Chairman of the State Audit 
Commission, as provided by the organic law on state audit.  
 The King shall appoint the Auditor-General with the advice of the Senate from 
persons with expertise and experience in state audit, accounting, internal audit, finance or 
other fields. 
 The President of the Senate shall countersign the Royal Command appointing the 
Chairman and members of the State Audit Commission and the Auditor-General. 
 Members of the State Audit Commission shall hold office for a term of six years 
from the date of their appointment by the King and shall serve for only one term. 
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has powers and duties to set out state audit policies, formulate rules and procedures 
in connection with the budgetary and fiscal disciplines, give consultancy, give 
suggestions for improving the state audit, determine administrative penalties, and 
carry out the consideration and decision upon the disciplinary, budgetary and fiscal 
offences.      
 (3) The Ombudsman 
 The Ombudsman is the constitutional organ which is conferred a crucial role 
of inspecting the exercise of state powers. In this regard, it is empowered to consider 
and inquire into the complaint for fact-findings in the following cases: (a) failure to 
perform in compliance with the law or performance beyond powers and duties as 
provided by the law of a Government official, an official or employee of a State 
agency, State enterprise or local government organisation and (b) performance of or 
omission to perform duties of a Government official, an official or employee of a 
State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation, which unjustly 
causes injuries to the complainant or the public, whether such act is lawful or not.  
1.3 The Organ Supervising Elections  
According to the Constitution, the Election Commission is established as the 
supervisory organ to supervise an election of members of the House of 
Representatives, an election of senators, as well as an election of members of a 
local assembly and local administrators. In addition, the Election Commission 
oversees the voting in a referendum for the purpose of rendering it to proceed in an 
honest and fair manner. Under section 144 paragraph two of the Constitution, the 
Election Commission has powers and duties to find facts and make a decision on 
any problem or any dispute arising under the organic law on the election of members 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 Qualifications, prohibitions, selection, election, and vacation of office of members 
of the State Audit Commission and the Auditor-General as well as powers and duties of the 
State Audit Commission, the Auditor-General and the Office of the State Audit Commission 
shall be in accordance with the organic law on state audit. 
 The determination of qualifications and procedure for the election of persons to be 
appointed as members of the State Audit Commission and the Auditor-General shall be 
made in the manner which can secure persons of appropriate qualifications and integrity and 
which can provide for the guarantee of the independence in the performance of duties of 
such persons. 
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of the House of Representatives and senators, the organic law on political parties, 
the organic law on the voting in a referendum and the law on the election of 
members of local assemblies or local administrators. 
1.4 Other Constitutional Bodies.  
 There are two remaining constitutional organs. These are the National 
Human Rights Commission and the frequency distribution agency pursuant to 
section 4015 of the Constitution. 
.  (1) The National Human Rights Commission  
 According to the Constitution, the National Human Rights Commission has 
the powers and duties to (a) examine and report the commission or omission of acts 
which violate human rights, (b) propose appropriate remedial measures to the person 
or agency committing or omitting such acts for taking action, (c) propose to the 
National Assembly and the Council of Minister policies and recommendations with 
regard to the revision of laws, rules or regulations for the purpose of promoting and 
protecting human rights, and (d) prepare an annual report for the appraisal of 
situations in the sphere of human rights in the country and submit it to the National 
Assembly. 
 (2) The Frequency Distribution Agency 
 Section 40 of the Constitution sets up an independent regulatory body to be 
charged with the duties to distribute frequencies and supervise radio or television 
broadcasting and telecommunications businesses. 
 Having pointed out all the independent organs under the Constitution, it must 
be recalled that the decision of the Constitutional Court above establishes a 
                                                          
15 Section 40: Transmission of frequencies for radio or television broadcasting and radio 
telecommunication are national communication resources for public interest. 
 There shall be an independent regulatory body having the duty to distribute the 
frequencies under paragraph one and supervise radio or television broadcasting and 
telecommunication business as provided by law. 
 In carrying out the act under paragraph two, regard shall be had to utmost public 
benefit at national and local levels in education, culture, State security, and other public 
interest including fair and free competition. 
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precedent to the effect that all these agencies or bodies are placed outside the 
jurisdiction of the Administrative Court. 
 2. Administrative Disputes under Dual Jurisdiction: A Mistake? 
 Now that we are now bound by the decision of the Constitution Court No. 
24/2543 above that actions by independent agencies established by the Constitution 
do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court, we will have yet to 
find it hard to explain why such agencies' actions elude the scrutiny net of the 
Administartive Court albeit those actions are administrative in nature and concern 
the exercise of administrative powers as well. Illustrations include orders given in 
connection with personnel appointment, removal or disciplinary punishment. If, for 
example, Head of an independent agency under the Constitution issues an order 
dismissing its official and it is challenged that the order is unlawfully made, then, 
the dispute in question, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 
24/2543, is outside the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court. It this connection, 
section 271 of the Constitution provides: "The Courts of Justice have the powers to 
try and adjudicate all cases except those specified by this Constitution or by the law 
to be within the jurisdiction of other courts." It follows, therefore, that the dispute in 
the hypothetical dismissal order case above is to be submitted to the Court of Justice.  
 It is questionable whether it is intended by the Constitution that 
administrative acts by independent bodies under the Constitution are to be within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice rather than the Administrative Court or whether it 
is merely an unexpected consequence of the decision of the Constitutional Court. 
Indeed, according to section 9 paragraph two of the Organic Act on the 
Establishment of the Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure, 
B.E. 2542 (1999), the Administrative Court has the power to try and adjudicate all 
general administrative disputes, except the disputes specified by law to be under the 
jurisdiction of other courts. It seems that we will have to bear the uneasy sentiment 
on this point.  
 
____________________ 
